US Nuclear Arsenal Expansion Debate: Risks and Alternatives to Arms Buildup

The United States should not expand its nuclear arsenal despite rising nuclear threats from China and the expiration of key arms control treaties, according to a leading foreign policy expert. Erin D. Dumbacher, Stanton Nuclear Security Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense and National Security Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues in a Foreign Affairs essay that adding more weapons would increase risks without enhancing security.

Since the Cold War, U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles have decreased significantly—by about 80 percent—thanks to arms control agreements like the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). However, China’s nuclear arsenal has grown rapidly over the past six years and is projected to exceed 1,000 warheads by 2030, raising concerns about a potential arms race. Meanwhile, the expiration of New START in early 2024 removed the last formal limits on U.S.-Russian nuclear competition.

Some strategists advocate expanding the U.S. arsenal, especially to include more low-yield “tactical” nuclear weapons. They argue that matching adversaries weapon-for-weapon would deter limited nuclear use. But Dumbacher warns that this approach is misguided. The U.S. already possesses sufficient nuclear forces to deter catastrophic attacks. The goal of deterrence is not to mirror every weapon an adversary has, but to prevent escalation in the first place.

Modernizing existing strategic forces should take priority, she writes. The U.S. nuclear modernization program, launched in 2010 with a $1 trillion price tag, aims to replace aging bombers, missiles, submarines, and warheads. Yet many programs are over budget and behind schedule. The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program is 81 percent over budget, and plutonium pit production targets are deemed unachievable. Without timely replacements, the U.S. risks losing key capabilities as current systems age out.

Expanding the arsenal would further strain modernization efforts and risk triggering a costly arms race, Dumbacher argues. It would also increase the danger of miscalculation. More diverse nuclear options—such as low-yield weapons—could blur the line between conventional and nuclear attacks, raising the risk that adversaries misinterpret launches and escalate unnecessarily. In a crisis, added nuclear options do not make the U.S. safer; they make conflict more unpredictable.

Deterrence relies on clarity and credibility. A more varied nuclear arsenal complicates reassurance and could encourage adversaries to escalate rather than back down. History shows that nuclear weapons are not effective tools for coercion in conflict. Escalation often follows unpredictable paths, not a rational “ladder,” as Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby has noted. The U.S. should focus on modernizing its strategic forces and improving conventional deterrence—especially in the Western Pacific—rather than pursuing unnecessary expansions that could undermine stability.

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